Reply With QuoteOriginally Posted by siraj
Nece ih tretirati kao strane students. Taj ce dio ostati kao I do sada. Jedino ce se promijeniti stvari koje direktno zadiru u suverenitet VB, pravosudje I ECB.
Active Member
Da studiraju mogu i sad, mozemo i mi. Nego je stvar oce li britanija njih tretirati kao internacionalnce, oce li im trebati vize. To ne moze niko znati dok se ne dogovore za sve to. Ovdje ljudi ni da imaju insajdere na najvisim mjestima u EU pa znaju sta ce se mijenjati a sta nece.
"Like all universities, QMUL charges two different rates of tuition fees for each individual programme of study. The two different rates are know as 'home' and 'overseas'. Traditionally, these terms come from the fact that, broadly speaking, 'home' fees are charged to UK and EU nationals and 'overseas' fees are charged to international students. "
Member
Nece ih tretirati kao strane students. Taj ce dio ostati kao I do sada. Jedino ce se promijeniti stvari koje direktno zadiru u suverenitet VB, pravosudje I ECB.
Davor
Banned
УК,Њемачка и Француска су најјаче земље ЕУ и сам излазак УК представља проблем. Много више ће сада људи у самој ЕУ бити против ЕУ, и без овога анти ЕУ став је јачао а сада посебно.
ЕУ у оваком облику тешко ће опстати, или ће нешто мијењати или се распасти.
Active Member
Svako ima svoje misljenje. Ja ipak mislim da EU nece pustiti Britaniju da izadje tek tako a da nema posledica, jer znaju dobro da i druge drzave bi voljele da izadju i to jos vise ako vidu da je Britaniji isto kao bez EU.
Member
Merkel je upravo rekla da ne treba biti neprijateljskih I osvetoljubivih koraka prema VB I da ne trebamo doprinositi Jos dubljem razdoru unutar Evrope, nego saradjivati na pronalasku rjesenja probema I izazova na najbolji moguci nacin. Sve ono plasenje je bilo propaganda, a sada valja prihvatiti realnost i ici dalje.
Davor
Member
Bravo!
Zashto li se uporno podsjecam pricha "trebace vam vize da predjete preko Kolovrata", "necete moci da se lijechite na VMA", "studenti ce vam biti tretirani kao da su iz Burkine Faso", "bice premija kad osvojite bod protiv Estonije, Albanije...", "Za godinu cete da nas molite da se vratite jer necete imati shta da jedete i proizvodite"...
Ridin' on the black train
Active Member
Normalno da ce to da izjavi. Nece da kaze, e tesko vama sada pa da zapali jos vise ove sto su protiv EU.
Nego, evo citam ovo: Crnogorka u Engleskoj: Zbog posla i plata smo izašli iz EU!
Imigrant prica o Britaniji kao da je njena zemlja i nece da vidi druge Evropske imigrante kako dolaze tamo.
Svasta, jos prica o tome " Ako ja sad od Italijana, od kog sam i do sad kupovala materijal, naručim tri kontejnera robe, da li će on da me odbije? Da li će on sad da mi kaže ‘Neću ništa da vam prodam jer ste izašli iz EU?’ I, da li ću ja mom njemačkom kupcu reći ‘E, sad morate više da platite?’ Ništa od toga se neće desiti. Neće biti neke drastične razlike. Ako neko hoće da kupi moj proizvod, kupiće ga"
Ne vjerujem da ces sve uvoziti normalno kao sto si do sada, gospodjo, ne ako EU ima imalo pameti, moraces placati vise, i moraces placati takse sto prodajes u EU. U EU se roba krecala slobodno, koliko toliko, da vidimo kako ce se sad krecati iz UK u EU.
Na UK sajtove mi se toliko puta desavalo da ni sam mogao kupovati proizvode jer su bili namijenjenji samo za EU. Naravno, oni sad ce imati 2 godine da ih se otarase, ali me bas zanima kako ce se sve ovo odraziti na UK nakon tog perioda.
Last edited by siraj; 24-06-16 at 14:08.
Senior Member
Haha najbolje bi bilo da je izjavila suprotno od toga... I milo rece da smo rame uz rame s Monakom...
Junior Moderator
znali su svi ili skoro svi leave glasači da će na kraći rok funta i njihova ušteđevina izgubiti vrijednost i da to neće biti baš tako lagano ekonomski pregurati, ali to nisu CG šišnjari koji prodaju lične za 20e jer bitno je da se ima za taj dojč danas a šta će zbog te odluke biti nakon nekoliko godina nije ni bitno
zato su oni tu gdje su i mi tu gdje smo
She is only here to annoy herself!
Active Member
Eto malo vise od ljudi koji znaju nesto o ovome, a manje od nas koji se pravimo da znamo nesto o tome.
But the UK would be wrong to assume that it could dictate terms in any negotiation with the EU by virtue of the fact that it is running a trade deficit. First, the EU buys half of Britain’s exports whereas the UK accounts for little over 10 per cent of exports from the rest of the EU, so the UK would be in a weak position to negotiate access on its terms. Second, half of the EU’s trade surplus with the UK is accounted for by just two memberstates: Germany and the Netherlands. Most EU memberstates do not run substantial trade surpluses with the UK, and some run deficits with it. Any agreement would require the assent of the remaining 27 members, some of whom buy more from Britain than they sell to it.
To consider what sort of EU trade agreement might realistically be on offer to Britain, an overview of current arrangements for non-EU countries is needed. It is clear that only one of these would be politically realistic for a Britain that quit, and that it would have potentially far-reaching implications for the country’s trade and investment.
EEA membership:
If Britain joined the European Economic Area (EEA), British firms would have unimpeded access to the single market and would continue to benefit from the EU’s trade deals with other countries. But Britain would have no say over EU trade policy, and in order to qualify for EEA membership, the UK would still have to abide by EU regulations while enjoying very little input into the drafting of those regulations. EEA member-states largely experience ‘regulation without representation’. And if an EEA member fails to implement a regulation, the EU can suspend its membership. Indeed, the UK could face increasing regulatory costs as a member of the EEA, because it would no longer be in a position to ensure that EU regulations were proportionate, and would have to abide by whatever the remaining EU members agreed between themselves. Furthermore, rules of origin would apply to British exports to the EU, and the administrative costs of working out the tariff costs of extra-EU imports can be large.
Customs union:
An alternative to EEA membership would be a customs union of the kind that Turkey has with the EU. This arrangement is not really a ‘union’, as tariffs are decided in Brussels, with no Turkish input. Turkey must also follow the EU’s preferential agreements with nonEuropean countries. The UK would have no input into EU trade policy but would have to comply with it. Not only would British-based manufacturers have to comply with EU product standards, but the UK would have to abide by large sections of the EU’s acquis communautaire. Failure to do so could lead to the suspension of market access or the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Customs unions are intended as precursors to full EU membership, even if in Turkey’s case progress has been very slow since the union entered into force in 1995. It is hard to see how this would be the best relationship for the UK upon quitting the union
Swiss-style:
As irritation at ‘Brussels interference’ is at the heart of the eurosceptic case against EU membership, the UK would find it politically intolerable after leaving the EU to accept hand-me-down legislation as the Norwegians do in the EEA or the Turks do as part of their customs union. A Swiss-style relationship based on bilateral negotiations and agreements would be inherently more palatable. Switzerland’s relationship with the EU rests on a series of bilateral sectoral agreements – 20 of them important, another 100 less so – and not all important sectors are covered. Switzerland has free trade in goods, but unlike the EEA it has no agreement with the EU on services. Swiss access is limited to those parts of the EU services market for which they have brokered sectoral agreements with the EU. The UK’s financial services industry would face the same challenges as its Swiss counterpart; Switzerland has no accord with the EU on financial services, except for a 1989 agreement on non-life insurance.10
The Swiss develop their legislation with the EU in mind, because they want to gain reciprocal access to the single market on the basis that their legislation is equivalent to that of the EU. But Switzerland has no common institutions with the EU to guarantee such equivalence. The UK would be free to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with non-EU countries, but these could prove less of a benefit than they appear (see below). Moreover, the Commission (and member-state governments) are increasingly frustrated with the Swiss arrangement as it involves constant renegotiation of bilateral agreements when EU legislation moves on. As a result, it might not even be possible for Britain.
A free trade agreement:
The UK could leave the EU and sign a free trade agreement with it. Given the importance of the UK market to the eurozone, the UK would probably have little difficulty in negotiating an FTA. There is a good chance that the tariffs levied by the EU on British manufactured goods would be zero. However, an FTA with the EU would not leave Britain free to set its own regulations. As part of any deal with the EU to create an FTA, the EU would make demands on labour market rules and health and safety, and in all likelihood competition policy would be subject to mutual regulatory oversight. The deeper the trade agreement, the more EU regulation the UK would have to abide by. British manufacturers would certainly have to continue to comply with EU product standards and other technical specifications in order to sell their goods to other EU countries. In all likelihood, UK firms would continue to manufacture to only one set of product specifications determined by the EU, in order to avoid the costs associated with duplication. As with a customs union, the UK would still be subject to anti-dumping rules. The UK might succeed in ensuring that any FTA with the EU included access to EU services markets. But at best that would only give Britain the same level of access that it currently enjoys; Britain would not be in a position to push for the further liberalisation of services trade. And without Britain pushing such liberalisation, progress within the EU would almost certainly be very slow. Services account for an unusually high proportion of total UK exports, so the country has much to gain from EU-wide liberalisation of services (in 2012 exports of goods and services totalled Ł475 billion, of which Ł193 billion were services). The UK’s trade in services with non-EU markets might also be impaired if leaving the EU undermined the attractiveness of the UK as a financial hub and as a centre for business consultancy and other services: Britain’s membership of the EU is important for many foreign investors in these sectors, but they also export to non-European markets from their UK operations. What would be the potential benefits of Britain controlling its own trade policy? It is not always easy to find a consensus among 28 countries; some influential member-states are less enthusiastic free-traders than, say, the UK or the Netherlands. The European Parliament can exert some influence on the EU’s FTAs, since a vote from MEPs is required to approve them, so EU trade agreements may on occasion be less liberal than the UK would like. Withdrawing from the EU altogether could potentially reduce the prices of imported goods from outside the EU, on the assumption that the UK reduced tariffs to below EU levels. Indeed, Britain might opt to have a unilateral free trade policy. However, the EU has signed numerous FTAs that have been liberal and beneficial to the UK and there are reasons to believe that the UK would be less successful in brokering comparable agreements on its own (see ‘trade negotiations’ below). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the UK would opt to reduce tariffs to zero if it were to quit the EU. For example, it is far from clear that the UK would choose to reduce agricultural tariffs more quickly than the EU. The British government may well decide to protect its agricultural sector in an effort to maintain domestic production and provide for food security. Britain’s agricultural lobby is powerful and would press hard to keep hold of the privileges it enjoys through EU membership: generous financial support under the CAP and protection from more efficient producers.
Active Member
Trade under WTO rules
Finally, if the UK balked at the requirements of a free trade area, it could opt to trade with the EU under WTO rules. The UK would not have to comply with EU regulations, but it would face the EU’s Common External Tariff (CET) and substantial NTBs to trade. For example, food imports are subject to an average EU tariff of 15 per cent, while car imports face a 10 per cent tariff, and car components, 5 per cent. Under this scenario, UK manufactured exports could be hit hard. For example, the EU is easily the biggest market for British car-makers, and the country’s car components industry is fully integrated into pan-EU supply chains. Indeed, a much higher proportion of UK exports to the rest of the EU take the form of intermediate goods than is the case for Britain’s exports to the rest of the world. These would be much less cost-competitive within Europe if they faced tariffs. UK goods exports to the EU would also be vulnerable to anti-dumping duties.11
The implications of relying on only WTO rules for Britain’s tradable services industries could be serious. The WTO has made little progress in freeing up trade in services (see ‘trade negotiations’ below), so British firms’ access to the EU’s services market would be limited. This scenario is much less likely than a FTA: very few trading relationships of the scale and complexity of the one between the UK and the EU are undertaken under mere WTO rules. In summary, a Swiss-type arrangement, a customs union or EEA membership would not address the reason for the UK quitting the EU in the first place. The UK would still have to comply with the acquis communautaire in exchange for market access, but it would be powerless to influence the acquis. In practice, the only option that would make any sense would be to go with as deep an FTA as possible with the EU, with all the constraints outlined above, and then try to sign as many bilateral trade agreements with non-EU countries as possible. This would be much harder than envisaged by Britain’s eurosceptics. Much of the debate in the UK about the implications of a British exit from the EU for the country’s trade and investment presupposes the existence of a flourishing multilateral trade system. The reality is rather different. Multilateral trade liberalisation has essentially stalled since the Uruguay Round came into effect in 1995. Emerging economies have assumed greater importance in the trading system and they are less committed to multilateralism than the mid-sized OECD countries they have supplanted. Preferential trade areas have become more important than multilateral trade policy, and as a result reciprocity has assumed greater importance. Finally, tariffs are no longer as important as non-tariff barriers to trade. These trends have a strong bearing on how the UK would fare outside of the EU.
Trade negotiations
The EU has a plethora of FTAs with third countries and a complex system of unilateral trade preferences. If Britain quit the EU, it would not inherit the EU’s bilateral trade agreements; it would have to renegotiate trade agreements with non-European countries from scratch. Renegotiating these would be far from straightforward. The process would be time-consuming, leaving Britain’s exporters facing higher barriers to trade, and for many countries negotiating a free trade deal with a relatively small economy like the UK would not be a big priority. Furthermore, the UK’s administrative resources could be overstretched if it had to pursue a plethora of negotiations simultaneously. Second, leverage is crucial to forcing open markets and leverage is about reciprocity: the concessions a country can make, that is to say what non-tariff barriers and tariffs it is prepared to cut. A relatively small and open economy such as the UK would enjoy little in the way of leverage. The EU’s imports from China are seven times larger than the UK’s. By virtue of its size (over a quarter of global output and a population of 500 million) the EU is in a strong position when it comes to trade negotiations: the bigger the domestic market, the greater an economy’s negotiating power. British eurosceptics ignore the importance of reciprocity. If the EU was completely open it would have little leverage in trade negotiations. Eurosceptics assert that the EU’s ability to use its heft is undermined by its agricultural protectionism and the reluctance of its member-states to liberalise their services markets. They argue that the UK would find it easier than the EU to negotiate deeper free trade agreements, including substantive service sector access, because of the openness of its own service sector, its openness to trade and its lack of agricultural protectionism. But the CAP is less of an obstacle to multilateral trade liberalisation than it once was because price supports have been phased out. And it is hard to believe that the UK would, for example, have had more success in prising open India’s services market on its own than as part of the EU. Overall, the EU has been adept at using its economic clout in negotiations with China, India and the US, for example. A UK outside of the EU might well be less effective. With the UK unable to offer much in exchange, would countries bother to negotiate with it?
Active Member
The impact on investment
The UK is very successful at attracting foreign investment. It is home to a larger stock of EU and US FDI than any other EU member-state and is the preferred location for investment from the other markets. The rest of the EU has grown steadily in importance as a source of FDI for the UK: in 1997 EU countries accounted for 30 per cent of the accumulated stock of investment, but this proportion rose to 50 per cent in 2012. Over this period, the share accounted for by the US fell from 45 per cent to 28 per cent, and that of the rest of the world from 19 per cent to 14 per cent. In absolute terms, investment from all sources has risen strongly, but it has increased much faster from the EU than from anywhere else (the stock of EU FDI is now equivalent to 30 per cent of UK GDP.)
The UK undoubtedly derives considerable benefits from its openness to foreign investment, but foreign capital is more mobile than domestic capital. Foreign-owned businesses are more likely to relocate activity if they disagree with the direction of government policy than locally-owned ones. It is difficult to quantify what proportion of the UK’s considerable inward stock of FDI in manufacturing and services depends on the country’s membership of the EU. But it is also hard to dispute that leaving the EU would make the UK a less attractive investment location for firms intending to sell to other EU markets from their UK facilities, even if the UK succeeded in agreeing a wideranging FTA with the EU. EU membership is only one of a number of factors that firms consider when deciding between various locations, but faced with two potential locations with similar strengths, Britain’s position outside the EU would be likely to count against it. After all, for some of these inward investors unrestricted access to the EU market is of pivotal importance. Which forms of FDI would be most vulnerable? Manufacturing capacity is relatively easier to relocate because it is more capital intensive than service sectors where capital predominantly comes in human form: people are harder to move than machines. Manufactured goods also tend to be tradable and hence market access is highly important. Perhaps the most vulnerable sector would be car manufacturing – the part of the UK’s manufacturing industry that is growing most strongly, and one which is almost entirely in foreign ownership. Factories would not close overnight, but it would be harder for firms to justify new investment in their British plants, and component suppliers could opt against building up industrial capacity in the UK. Both Nissan and Jaguar Land Rover – the sector’s two biggest investors – have already indicated that a UK exit would reduce the attractiveness of the UK as a manufacturing base. The food industry is similarly highly integrated into the rest of the EU economy and likely to suffer in a similar way. Another major centre for foreign investment in the UK is the computer software industry. The factors which attracted foreign investors in this field to Britain, such as the availability of skilled labour and the English language, will remain if the UK leaves the EU. But would these firms continue to use the UK as a springboard to serve the wider pan-European market if they no longer enjoyed unrestricted access to that market? The impact on the services sector would in all likelihood be less dramatic, not least because services as a whole are less tradable than manufactured goods. Foreign investment in service industries that serve the domestic market would be least affected. The tradable services sector would be less likely to leave the UK than the manufacturing industry, because it relies on large concentrations of highly skilled people, who are expensive to recruit and difficult to move. Nevertheless, the UK would no doubt lose attractiveness as a location for these kinds of businesses, and activity would gradually relocate from the UK to elsewhere in the EU. The most vulnerable sectors are almost certainly the financial and business services sectors: Goldman Sachs, one of the biggest foreign investors in this sector, has already made it clear that it would relocate business from London to other EU financial centres were the UK to quit the union.
Is it not possible that the UK could become more attractive as an investment location if it quit the EU? For example, outside the Union would the British authorities not be free to reduce the cost of doing business in the UK, for example by lowering social and environmental standards? Would the UK not also be free to negotiate the kind of deep FDI agreements with non-European countries which elude the EU because of the differing interests of the various EU member-states? And could this not offset the loss of market access, leaving the UK more attractive as an investment location? The UK would certainly be freer to introduce less onerous regulatory requirements for new technologies, such as nano-technologies, the life sciences, space vehicles and interactive robots. This could increase the attractiveness of the UK as an investment location for these sorts of activities. But it is far from clear that an unencumbered UK would reduce environmental and social standards. After all, some environmental standards in the UK are more stringent than those required by the EU. Britain has, for example, introduced a far more ambitious system of carbon pricing than that countenanced by the EU as a whole. Secondly, any UK government would face fierce domestic opposition to any further erosion of labour and social standards. After all, the UK already has one of the most flexible labour markets in the OECD. It could, of course, choose to live without any equivalent to the EU’s working time directive, but there is no evidence this directive has a deleterious impact on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. And it would be a brave government that explained to Britons why they should lose their statutory right to four weeks’ paid holiday a year.12 Moreover, any potential benefits from a reduction in regulatory costs would in all likelihood be more than offset by the greater difficulties in recruiting skilled foreign workers. A UK on the outside of the EU would in theory be free to run an open door immigration policy, but this possibility can be discounted because a major reason for British hostility to the EU is unrestricted EU migration. The UK would inevitably have a less open labour market, which would impose costs and difficulties on businesses.13 Finally, the UK would struggle to negotiate comprehensive international investment agreements for the same reason that it would struggle to broker favourable bilateral trade deals: the UK is already very open to foreign capital, so it would enjoy little leverage when it came to such negotiations. It might be able to come to an agreement with small, like-minded economies, but would struggle to gain better access to major emerging economies such as China and India.
Conclusion
The UK has very little to gain by quitting the EU and much to lose. Britain’s interest lies in reducing the cost of trade with its largest trade partners – which the EU evidently does. The CER’s model suggests that the country’s membership of the EU’s single market has boosted its trade in goods with the rest of the Union, and there is little evidence that trade overall has been diverted away from other major trading partners. While the single market for services has not been a great success – Britain’s trade in services with the US has grown as quickly as with the EU over the last decade – leaving the EU would not reduce barriers to services trade. It may increase them, unless the EU granted Britain the same level of access to its services markets that is currently available. While it is impossible to know exactly what terms a departing Britain could negotiate, it seems unlikely that all those trade gains would disappear: Britain and the EU would probably negotiate an FTA, although it is impossible to know how comprehensive it would be. But life would be uncomfortable on the outside: the UK would be powerless to push for liberalisation of EU services markets; it would find that in some sectors, inward investors would switch their money to countries inside the EU; and it would find it very difficult to negotiate trade agreements with non-EU countries as comprehensive as those that the EU regularly agrees. The idea that the UK would be freer outside the EU is based on a series of misconceptions: that a medium sized, open economy could hold sway in an increasingly fractured trading system, dominated by the US, the EU and China; that the EU makes it harder for Britain to penetrate emerging markets; and that foreign capital would be more attracted to Britain’s economy if it were no longer a part of the single market. The UK should base policy on evidence, which largely points to one conclusion: that it should stay in the EU.
Source:https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default...jan14-8285.pdf
Banned
B92: Bez čekanja: Morgan Stenli se već seli http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/svet.ph...nav_id=1147374
Američki finansijski gigant se već danas seli iz Londona, nema čekanja.
Banned
Poenta je da CG hrli ka EU pa sad mora da se plasira prica kako ce GB ispastati zbog ovog poteza.
Last edited by Sandor Kolar; 24-06-16 at 16:45.
Forum Addict
Moze se desiti da Kameron sacuva Veliku Britaniju koliko i Slobo veliku Srbiju
Ukoliko Eu ne postupi tako onda je to kraj Unije. Ako VB izlazi i nikome nista, zasto bi neka druga clanica bila i bez veze placala clanarine, slusala cak i budalaste odluke birokrata iz Brisela i ...?
Za pocetak Citigroup u Frankfurt sto je i logika, a razvod poceti sa ponudom uslova koje vaze za Svajcarsku i strogim ogranicenjem trgovine i registracije firmi po principu Aliexpres... Ukoliko EU pocne metiljavo "nit smrdi nit mirise" i muricu ostre na male drzave koje treba da udju u EU pocece refernedumi i ne samo u Holandiji i Danskoj sto je pocetak kraja
Forum Addict
Ako smo mi država koja je lider u EU integracijama a zapravo u svakoj sferi postoje neke mafijaške skupine ( što je valjda dokazano ) onda nije ni čudo što oće da pobježu iz takvog ambijenta ...
deuscroix
Banned
desilo se onako kako je majka kraljica zeljelAsamo budala moze da misli kako se VB zajebala pa nije vam to crna gora i ne valdaju tamo jelici simovici gvozdenovici i ne vode univerzitet i nauku ljudi sa divljim diplomama tamo donose odluke ljudi koji gledaju sto god unaprijed kako drustvo treba da izgleda i sto se tice toga da ce sad svi krenut za njom nece jer se njihov polozaj razlikuje mnogo od drugih i oni ce vrlo lako nastavit dalje a ovi sto su ostali jedino sto ce pokrenut jesu reforme u EU i mnogo je veci razlog izlaska iz EU nego sto je ekonomija ekonomija je sitnica
Junior Moderator
Sto se nas tice ,,ista meta, isto odstojanje'', odnosno, niti jedan centar moci nece prema nama promjeti svoje politicko djelovanje. Velika Britanija ce opstat (nebitno sad u kom obliku) i to je neosporno.
Sto se EU i nase pozicije tice, ajde da ponovim po n-ti put: ,,daj nam EU standarde, pa ne moramo u EU, no do tih standarda mozda brze dodjemo putem prikljucivanja''.
Sent from my 5025D
Forum Addict
Evo šta kažu Norvežani koji su na dva referenduma glasali da ne budu članica ... ništa se neće desit ...
deuscroix
Forum Addict
Lako je njima sa naftom da seru
rm -rf /
Banned
Imam 2 pitanja, molio bih za konkretne odgovore :
1. Hocu li sad placat carinu pri uvozu Bentlija, Jaguara, Land Rovera i McLarena ?
2. Ostaje li za Sportsdirect i dalje 150e porudzba po paketu?
SAd ce britanci da nam povecaju cijenu dostave, tacno sam znao.....buhahaha
Forum Addict
Da malo relaksiramo... Tunel ispod La Mansa sa francuske strane... :-)
--------------->
<---------------
Odavde dovde...
Junior Moderator
EU će morati da reaguje, i to prilično oštro, ako ne želi da se vrlo brzo raspane...
#fakenews
Forum Addict
deuscroix
Forum Addict
Prejaka je funta i previsok standard englezima da ce se zalecet ista da urade.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
f6
There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks