Page 9 of 9 FirstFirst ... 56789
Results 201 to 219 of 219

Thread: Crna Gora na ivici rata: 1998-2000

  1. #201
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Segmenti iz par knjiga koje su se bavile temom:

    Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative (Second Edition, 2012)
    Charles Ingrao
    Thomas A. Emmert

    Montenegro: A Polity in Flux, 1989–2000
    Montenegro’s role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and events within the republic during the critical years under consideration are often overlooked (or treated only superficially) in the plethora of literature focusing on the dissolution of the
    Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socialistička federativna republika Jugoslavija [SFRY]) and its subsequent wars of disintegration. Montenegro largely avoided war in the 1990s, but as Yugoslavia’s smallest republic it faced numerous challenges as the SFRY dissolved; it was by no means immune from the problems facing neighboring republics.

    The main focus of this chapter is, therefore, the impact of wider Yugoslav events on Montenegro’s internal politics, the relationship between ruling elites in Serbia and Montenegro, and the intraparty dynamics within Montenegro’s ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista [DPS]). So while war was avoided in Montenegro, the collapse of the SFRY had a significant impact upon the republic, resurrecting old divisions that pushed the republic to the brink of civil war in 1999.

    Subject to war and occupation twice in the first half of the twentieth century, Montenegro’s status as a republic within the SFRY had eased tensions between those who defined themselves as Serbs and were inclined toward close union with
    Serbia, and those Montenegrins who argued that they were a distinct nation and were inclined toward independence.

    But this preexisting division, one which had become manifest in the latter years of the reign of King Nicholas (Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš), was not the only fault line. The Greens (Zelenaši) and Whites (Bjelaši) division had also been compounded by the Partisan-Chetnik dynamic and, to a lesser extent, by the legacy of the 1948 Tito-Stalin split.

    Broadly speaking, however, the SFRY provided stability in Montenegro, and these divisions were concealed, if not forgotten. Montenegro, a tiny republic of 625,000 inhabitants, benefited economically and politically from the Yugoslav system. In part because of the large number of Partisan “national heroes” among their ranks, Montenegrins were disproportionately represented in the Yugoslav bureaucracy, police, and army. Ethnic relations were relatively stable and Montenegrins came to represent something of an ideal Yugoslav surrogate in their equidistance between Montenegrin and Serb nationalities.

    The postwar Montenegrin communist leadership was Yugoslav oriented, and Montenegro lagged behind others in the establishment of national institutions. Nationalism was, on the whole, contained. But as the SFRY began its painful demise in the late 1980s, Montenegro was thrust into a decade-long crisis, one that did not end until the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milošević in October 2000. During the period between 1989 and 2000, Montenegro passed through numerous internal political crises, from the so-called antibureaucratic revolution to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Bitter political struggles rekindled preexisting, if concealed, divisions as the trajectory of politics in the republic was determined. Indeed, the tumultuous events of the 1990s, discussed here, would establish the foundations for the republic’s independence in 2006.
    On the eve of Djukanović’s inauguration, Bulatović assembled his supporters in Podgorica. It was a return to the politics of the streets, a method used to devastating effect during the antibureaucratic revolution of 1988 and 1989.

    Initially, the protests were peaceful, but on the evening of the inauguration a peaceful walk descended into violence. As the protesters moved from the Assembly to the government building, tensions rose dramatically. An attempt to storm the government building was halted by police, who used tear gas to quell the increasingly violent demonstration.

    The police intervention had ensured that a bloody showdown was averted, and in the cold light of morning, both sides blamed each other for the chaos.

    Bulatović, increasingly on the defensive, described events as “a brutal police intervention against the citizens who were protesting because of the theft of the elections.” Thus, far from achieving their objective, the demonstrations
    turned out to be counterproductive for Bulatović.
    Djukanović was inaugurated as president on 14 January 1998, the day after the protests. (ovo je greška, 15. januar je dan inauguracije)

    The Djukanović faction of the DPS consolidated its position of strength in the immediate weeks and months. The opposition was shaken by its failure to overthrow the government; support for Bulatović was receding and the pro-Milošević political bloc was in turmoil. Seizing the opportunity presented by the spirit of the times, Djukanović made preparations for the parliamentary elections.

    But first, his faction wanted to ensure that it retained the DPS brand. As the ruling party in Montenegro since 1990, the party name carried weight.
    Retaining the name would provide both continuity and legitimacy—critical in such a period of flux. The faction that could retain the original party name of DPS might be perceived by the public to be the legitimate successor to the previously monolithic version of the party.

    Both factions coveted the DPS brand, but the High Court of Montenegro ruled that Bulatović’s DPS must give up its claim on the party name. As a result, on 21 March 1998 the pro-Serbian faction, led by Momir Bulatović and members of the powerful and influential Podgorica Lobby (former high-profile DPS members who for years had been critical toward Djukanović), formed the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partijaCrne Gore [SNP]).
    Last edited by ASC; 26-08-16 at 14:58.

  2. #202
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    ...........
    As the crisis in Kosovo threatened to escalate into war, pitting the SRJ against NATO, the Montenegrin government sought to distance itself, declaring neutrality and advocating dialogue with Kosovo Albanians in conjunction with the European Union (EU). But continued military actions by Serb forces and retaliations by the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës [UÇK/KLA]) were driving Serbia (and thus the SRJ) into possible military conflict with NATO, which had warned Milošević to halt military activity in Kosovo.

    As the rhetoric sharpened and the crisis escalated, the Montenegrin authorities became acutely aware that despite their self-proclaimed neutrality, Montenegro was home to strategic military sites that would be targeted as part of any NATO bombing campaign. Indeed, while the subsequent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia had significantly less impact in Montenegro than in Serbia, the internal situation in Montenegro steadily worsened as a result.

    In the early days of the 78-day bombing, the refugee crisis intensified. The continuing flow of refugees, numbering 80,000 (over 10 percent of Montenegro’s total population), put a considerable strain on the economy, while threatening to destabilize the delicate ethnic and social balance in the eastern parts of the Montenegrin Sandžak.

    As NATO bombs began to fall on Montenegro, Djukanović’s government was placed under significant pressure. He appealed to NATO leaders to halt bombing operations in Montenegro on the basis that it could threaten to destabilize the republic. Additionally, he met with religious leaders in Montenegro, appealing to them to help calm the increasing tensions. Djukanović also appealed to the special envoy of the EU, Wolfgang Petrisch (who visited Montenegro to assess the situation), to help stop the bombing and renew the negotiating process in Kosovo.

    Targeting Montenegro had only served to intensify internal political and social tensions. This was ominously manifested by a tense standoff between the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije [VJ]) and the 7th Battalion (formally a unit of the Yugoslav Army, although constituted primarily of SNP members) on one side, and the Montenegrin police on the other.
    SNP and pro-Serb party members, generally excluded from joining the police, took matters into their own hands, many joining the 7th Battalion.

    Indeed, because Montenegro did not possess its own army, Djukanović strengthened the Montenegrin police force to around 20,000 loyal policemen. The new force consisted of individuals who had left the federal army, DPS loyalists, and a number of Muslims and Albanians, who supported Djukanović in the wake of the DPS split.
    The police force subsequently became increasingly militarized, evolving into an army in all but name.
    There were also a number of quasi-military structures operating throughout Montenegrin territory. The Lovćen Guard, a paramilitary group located in Cetinje, selfproclaimed defenders of Montenegrin statehood, vowed to defend Montenegro
    from aggression.

    Awash with arms, Montenegro was on the brink. There were a number of scenarios in which a single shot would have facilitated chaos. In the areas of Debeli Brijeg on the Montenegrin-Croatian border and in Cetinje, the VJ added to the sense of crisis by erecting roadblocks and restricting movement between the hinterland and the coast. Within hours, protestors gathered outside the town’s municipality building, demonstrating against the roadblocks. When the VJ attempted to enter the town, a tense standoff between them and local militia began.

    The apprehension of three citizens by the VJ almost turned into an armed rebellion by the militia, the police, and ordinary citizens of Cetinje. Although a peaceful resolution was found (the VJ ceased their attempts to enter the town), the incident was indicative of the growing tensions throughout Montenegro. Tension was palpable in Podgorica, where fears of a military coup were intensifying, fueled by statements emanating from Belgrade.
    Last edited by ASC; 26-08-16 at 15:02.

  3. #203
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict (2013)
    Beáta Huszka

    The Montenegrin independence movement
    .................................................
    The aftermath of the elections (misli se na parlamentarne izbore u maju 1998 )

    After the elections which brought Đukanović’s bloc to another victory, the constitutional stand- off with Serbia further escalated. According to the Yugoslav constitution, the newly elected Montenegrin governing coalition was supposed
    to send its deputies to the Federal Chamber of Republics, where each republic had 20 deputies.

    Yet the Serbian regime did not let the winning parties take their seats in the federal parliament. SNP members were allowed to keep their mandates, however. This ensured that the federal parliament would keep on rubberstamping Milošević’s decisions. Consequently, Montenegro lost all meaningful connection with federal institutions, as Montenegrin seats were filled with Milošević’s loyalists.

    Initially, Montenegrin authorities tried to come up with a solution to the constitutional deadlock. They put forward their own proposal in August 1999 for a confederative arrangement of two sovereign states, yet in July 2000 the Serbian government eliminated the problem by pushing through it's amendments to the federal constitution, which secured the exclusion of the Montenegrin government from federal decision-making.

    After Milošević’s ‘constitutional coup d’état’, Montenegrin authorities began to say that Yugoslavia ceased to exist for them. ‘After these constitutional amendments, Yugoslavia is not the same any more. It is not the country designed by the 1992 Constitution any more’, said Marović.

    Montenegrin non-recognition of federal order served as a justification later on for Montenegrin ruling parties not participating in the 2000 general elections on the side of the Serbian democratic opposition, and shows why they did not recognize the federal government led by Vojislav Koštunica.

    As a response to Belgrade’s violation of the federal constitutional order, Montenegro ceased to recognize federal laws, and started to distance itself from Belgrade through economic policies. As a result, by the time democratic changes took place in Serbia in autumn 2000, the two republics practically constituted separate economic spaces.

    By 1998, federal authorities had stopped channelling revenues from sales and excise taxes to Montenegro that were due to the Montenegrin budget, upon which Montenegro stopped budgetary exchanges with the federation and began to take control of revenue sources in the republic.

    In 1999, Montenegro stopped requiring a FRY visa from foreigners entering the republic and began collecting customs duties on its external borders, while Serbia erected customs posts on its border with Montenegro.

    After Montenegrin authorities were excluded from the work of the Yugoslav central bank, Montenegro introduced the German mark in November 1999.
    In retaliation, Belgrade terminated electronic payments with Montenegro.

    In early 2000, Serbia put Montenegro under a trade blockade except for aluminium and steel.
    In return, Montenegro assumed full formal control over matters related to foreign trade and customs, and opened its own diplomatic representations in Washington, Brussels, Rome, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, London and Berlin.

    In addition, as the Kosovo conflict intensified and the Serbian Radical Party joined the government in Serbia, the Serbian government stepped up the army’s presence in Montenegro.

    Until the fall of Milošević, tensions between Montenegro and Serbia steadily escalated, and the outbreak of conflict often seemed imminent.

    Although Montenegrin authorities tried to keep a neutral stance on the Kosovo conflict, in practice they received tens of thousands of Albanian refugees from Kosovo and in general opposed the Serbian military crackdown on the province.

    In addition to the units of the federal army which were operating on the territory of Montenegro, the Seventh Battalion was an army unit filled with SNP members. As a result, fears started circulating that Montenegro was on
    the brink of armed conflict with Serbia.

    The Montenegrin state and media frequently talked about the possible outbreak of conflict. A media analyst warned, ‘there is reason to be afraid’, as one could even see this [Milošević’s actions] as pure election propaganda, were it not for the dark shadow of death that is hovering over Montenegro, the demon of SM’s [Slobodan Milošević’s] power, the experience of 10 years of post-Yugoslav wars.

    The US promised help to Đukanović in case Milošević provoked violence in Montenegro, which also indicated that the threat of conflict was perceived to be real at the time. Especially during the NATO bombings, there were some serious stand- offs between the Yugoslav army and the Montenegrin police.

    In the spring of 1999, reports of the presence of Serbian paramilitaries in Montenegro were frequent as well. Moreover, even after the Kosovo conflict ended, the situation remained tense.

    Vukasin Maras, head of the Montenegrin police, ‘reassured Montenegrin citizens that the ministry of interior is prepared to defend in case of a civil war in Montenegro’.

    Carl Bildt, the United Nations Secretary- General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans, announced that ‘Serbia and Montenegro, slowly but continuously, are moving towards a conflict’.

    In the face of this perceived threat, the Montenegrin government built up a police force of 24,000 members equipped not only with automatic weapons but also with combat vehicles.

    The general fear in Montenegro that Milošević might solve problems with the smaller republic through a coup was present all the way up until the federal elections in September 2000, as was apparent from the Montenegrin media. Statements
    by army commanders also made it clear that the army would intervene if Montenegro went ahead with the referendum on independence.

    While the fear of an approaching war with the Yugoslav army was intensifying, the ethnic Serbian population in the northern part of Montenegro also mobilized. In September 1999 the northern ‘tribes’ – as they called themselves – organized
    gatherings in protest against the government’s pro- independence moves.

    Their rhetoric threatened the use of force and expressed a common identity intolerant towards other nationalities. The protestors warned that ‘under no condition shall we accept separation of Montenegro from Yugoslavia, the community of states of the Serb people which we inseparably belong to ethnically, historically and spiritually’.
    The demonstration was also a show of force, as it was proclaimed that ‘the call for [a] sovereign Montenegro is the same as a call to take up arms’.

  4. #204
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
    Conflict Studies Research Centre

    THE PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL WAR IN MONTENEGRO
    C J Dick
    12. September 2000.

    PDF:
    http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/ca...ontenegro-1157
    https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/38646/2000_Sep.pdf

    DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD PRECIPITATE CIVIL WAR
    Provocation from Belgrade
    Milosevic has demonstrated that he is not concerned with the loss of territory, even Serb inhabited, per se. He has acquiesced in the loss of not only Slovenia and Macedonia but also of Slavonia, Krajina, Bosnia and (de facto) Kosovo. He would probably accept the defection of Montenegro too, even if it did mean loss of access to the sea, if it would serve his political end.

    His sole concern is retention of personal political power in Serbia – a
    determination reinforced by his international indictment as a war criminal. If letting an uncooperative Montenegro leave the FRY would reduce the dangers he faces in the heartland, he would face the prospect with equanimity. If its defection would threaten his domestic situation, or if his political position was dangerously weakening and he decided that he could survive only by once again playing the Serb nationalist card to rally support, he would have no compunction about trying to overthrow Djukanovic.
    If that meant civil
    war in Montenegro, so be it.

    In this context, it is worth noting that
    Montenegro is the only distraction left to him in his internal political power games.
    Croatia is relatively strong and on its way to international
    respectability.
    He can continue efforts to destabilize Kosovo, but NATO
    presence there will prevent him from accomplishing much. Likewise, NATO presence in Macedonia and Bosnia limits his room for manoeuvre in these areas.

    The critical questions, therefore, are:
    • Whether or not, in his view, an attempted coup in Montenegro, or a move to annex the Serbian/federalist, northern areas of it, would help Milosevic to win the September federal presidential and parliamentary (and Serbian local) elections;
    • Or could it provide him with an excuse to ignore or annul an unfavourable result;
    • And if Milosevic does win and the Montenegrin government decides to hold a referendum on independence, would an attempt to pre-empt the vote be likely to weaken or strengthen his position in Serbia.

    .................................................. ...........................

    First Option
    He can capitalize on the (controlled) media's criminalization of the opposition and accusations that they are the agents of hostile powers determined to break up or subjugate Serbia. and ban the more threatening opposition parties. This would convert a concealed, elective dictatorship into an open one – a move fraught with danger.

    The opposition controls many major cities. The introduction of martial law that would probably be required to cope with the backlash would mean confrontation with local government and a probably united, well-organized opposition capable of bringing tens of thousands onto the streets.

    The police might not be able to cope and the army's middle/junior leadership and rank and file might refuse to disperse the crowds – the "Romanian solution" (in reference to the overthrow of Ceausescu) talked about by opposition politicians last year.
    Indeed, there may be enough "young Turks" in the army who would be prepared to join a revolution, overthrow Milosevic, establish military rule and become kingmakers.
    The ruling political/criminal elite might desert him in an effort to save themselves and their privileges. The west might well support a revolutionary backlash – Milosevic would expect it to do so.

    Second option

    Milosevic can try to ride out the electoral storm, relying for victory on intensification of the pressures and constraints which already bear on the opposition and resorting to even greater, and therefore more obvious, manipulation of the elections.
    That may work, but it could lead to a backlash greater than that after the 1996 municipal elections, great enough, in fact, to threaten his regime's survival. If it does not work, almost his only remaining recourse would be to refuse to recognize the result.
    Such a course poses even greater dangers than the first one.

    Third Option
    If he decides that it is simply too risky to proceed with the elections, or if he lets them go ahead, right through to the second round, and loses, Montenegro could provide Milosevic with the excuse he needs to declare a state of emergency without giving rise to potentially unmanageable popular discontent.
    Action to crush the Djukanovic regime in the cause of preserving Yugoslav unity would rally many Serb nationalists to his side: after all, if Montenegro is allowed to leave the federation, where is the line to be drawn – at Vojvodina? at the Sandzak?
    If it were to be opposed by opposition politicians, Milosevic would be able, once again, to condemn them as unpatriotic, paid servants of the USA and NATO who are doing their masters' bidding in driving forward the destruction of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

    This time-honoured gambit of playing the nationalist card to get him out of a domestic political hole has succeeded in the past. Milosevic may well believe it could do so again.

    However, precipitating a showdown with the Montenegrin government would not be without risks.
    Firstly, the Serbian people might finally have tired of conflict and refuse to be distracted from domestic issues. Secondly, and perhaps more likely, NATO might intervene, this time with perhaps unmanageable political consequences.

    All of these options are potentially high-risk. It is possible that exploding Montenegro will appear to Milosevic, sooner or later, to be the least bad. In particular, several factors may convince him that the danger of NATO intervention is acceptably low.

    He may calculate that:
    • No power, not even (pace his own propaganda) the USA, is enthusiastic about a breakaway Montenegro, hence the so far limited and ambiguous support for Djukanovic;
    • The US administration, which is already encountering problems in Congress over its Balkan policy, will be paralysed throughout the autumn by the presidential election campaign;
    • Without American leadership, or even with it, given a growing disillusionment with the results of the Kosovo war, European prointerventionists will be unable to create a consensus for action;
    • Without intervention on the ground, for which there will be little appetite given the nature of the terrain and fighting and the problems already besetting the alliance in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO will be unable to accomplish much in Montenegro – and another air campaign against Serbia might be seen as politically impossible or counter-productive.
    • In any case, a Montenegrin adventure will be less dangerous than a year ago, when opening a second front would have been positively foolhardy.

    Developments Within Montenegro
    It has become customary to think of conflict within former-Yugoslavia as something that is fomented by Milosevic. While this has been largely true in the past, it need not always be so.

    As pointed out earlier, Montenegrin nationalists are gaining in strength and confidence. Djukanovic is having increasing difficulty in keeping his ruling coalition united behind his policy of gradualism (or fence-sitting).

    He may have his hand forced, or be supplanted, by those who desire an immediate referendum on independence. Drawing a possibly false parallel with Kosovo, such nationalists may believe that, when the chips are down, NATO will underwrite such a move and its results (even to the extent of coercing a recalcitrant north for fear that accepting partition would set an unwelcome precedent). Were Montenegro to force the issue rather than Belgrade, Milosevic's position in responding to "provocation" would be much strengthened, both domestically and internationally.

    There is currently a tense stand-off within Montenegro between the federal authorities, especially the VJ and the paramilitary 7th Military Police Battalion, and the Montenegrin, including the largely militarized police. It is entirely possible that one of the regular confrontations will get out of hand, with blood being spilled. This could lead to a consequent escalation of tensions, forcing both sides into corners from which civil war results despite the wishes of either side; giving way may simply be seen as a greater evil than conflict.

  5. #205
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    .........
    SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT
    Possible Triggers for Conflict
    The uneasy status quo may continue over the election period, though it would be unwise to count on it. It is unlikely to persist over a longer stretch as the internal situation in Montenegro and in Yugoslavia is unstable.
    Trigger points for the destabilization of Montenegro could be any of the following, alone or in combination:
    • President Djukanovic announces a referendum on independence;
    • The FRY government announces that it will suspend the Montenegrin parliament for unconstitutional activity (eg, trying to sabotage federal elections, denying Montenegrins a democratic choice, or persistent refusal to accept and implement federal laws);
    • Local outbreaks of violence in response to disputes over the control of military and other facilities, especially airports, leading to military activity by the VJ and possible mobilization to protect federal installations;
    • Montenegrin closure of the border with Serbia;
    • Montenegrin government mobilization of local defence/police forces under its control, possibly accompanied by a declaration by the Podgorica parliament of a referendum or even independence, or following a border incident or a dispute over the control of customs/transit of goods/attempt to lift the FRY blockade by force;
    • A change of leadership in Montenegro, or in the FRY, after which Montenegro initiates moves towards independence;
    • Increasing levels of political ("terrorist") violence in the FRY, blamed on violent Montenegrin nationalists and leading to the declaration of a FRYwide state of emergency;
    • Milosevic-controlled paramilitaries enter Montenegro and are opposed by the local population;
    • The north-south split in Montenegro revealed in the June local elections creates a de facto internal border in the republic.

    Scenarios for the Development of Conflict
    There is no realistic prospect of a pro-Milosevic coup ousting the Djukanovic government. The essential element of surprise action by forces at the heart of the regime is absent. Unlike Croatia and Bosnia when the break up of the old Yugoslavia started, the Montenegrin government is alert and wellprepared.

    It fields an increasingly well-armed, well-trained and largely reliable, mostly paramilitary, police force reputed to number up to 20,000 (making one Montenegrin in 30 a policeman!). The VJ's 2nd Army, stationed in Montenegro, is probably of similar strength and has almost a monopoly of heavy equipment. Its commander, Col Gen Obradovic is a Milosevic placeman and the majority of officers and soldiers are Serbs.
    However, not all of the 20% or so Montenegrins could be relied on and even many of the Serbs probably have little stomach for an internecine fight.

    Any attempt to seize power in Podgorica using the VJ, spearheaded by the Serb/federalist manned 7th Military Police Battalion, would inevitably be the precursor to civil war. The following scenarios suggest ways in which conflict could develop. They could develop consecutively as a result of escalation or simultaneously.

    First scenario
    Belgrade attempts to pre-empt by military force moves towards greater Montenegrin autonomy or independence.

    Each side mobilizes its assets in Montenegro, with Serbian nationalist militias moving in to reinforce the VJ.
    There is a short, sharp conflict, probably starting before the completion of mobilization, over control of federal strategic facilities such as Podgorica airport or the port of Bar.
    Fighting would be intense and largely conventional, limited to key political, administrative and transportation choke points and lasting a week or two.

    Whoever won this phase, it would, however, be unlikely to be decisive.

    There would likely be a slide into one of the other scenarios as the population would be both inflamed and polarized, with those hitherto reluctant to become involved being forced to choose sides.

    Second scenario

    Most likely, this would evolve from the first scenario.

    It could, though, as postulated above, develop from the current, highly visible stand-off between the VJ and the Montenegrin police which leads to armed clashes and/or a series of escalating political moves and counter-moves.

    In either case, a high intensity civil war develops. This would cover most or all of the country and involve most of the population in a struggle over the issue of independence; the more bitter and prolonged the struggle, the less possibility there will be of a compromise on greater autonomy for Montenegro within a FRY framework.
    The main contenders are likely to be rival militias/paramilitaries. Fighting would become increasingly brutal and civilians would be deliberately targeted by both sides, resulting in large displacements of population.

    As Montenegro is mainly mountainous, especially in the north, with few arterial roads connecting different regions, there is likely to be an intense struggle to seize and hold the mainly narrow passes.
    The northern region is mainly Serb and federalist inhabited, but the bulk of the Muslim population lives in the Sandzak (which straddles the border with Serbia) and there is a large Albanian enclave in the municipality of Plav on the border with Kosovo.
    These topographical and demographic facts would strongly influence the location and nature of the fighting, the flow of displaced persons and humanitarian aid efforts.

    Third scenario
    This is probably the most likely, possibly resulting from the failure of either side to win a quick victory in either of the other two.

    It could well stem from the refusal of the Serb/federalist north, supported by the VJ, to accept secessionist moves by the Podgorica government.
    In this case the conflict could possibly be confined to the mountainous regions of the north, though there could be no guarantee that it would not engulf the whole.

    The conflict would resemble that in Bosnia. Communities would be forced to choose between allegiances and pockets of fighting would develop between neighbours divided along political, ethnic and clan/family lines.
    Some villages would be razed and others subjected to prolonged sieges.

    There would be no well-defined front line; rather a series of disconnected battlefields with gaps between them.
    Much military effort would be directed less against the enemy's forces than against civilians with the aim of terrorising them into submission or flight.

    Population movements would largely comprise efforts by the old, women and children to flee, with the men staying put to fight.
    To complicate matters still further, banditry, blood - feuds (both traditional in the region) and squabbles over booty would be an added source of fighting.

    IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
    Standing aloof from a conflict in Montenegro is probably not an option for NATO.
    • When Montenegro adopted an anti-Milosevic stand during the Kosovo war (despite being subjected to NATO bombing), the alliance clearly promised to protect the republic from the consequences;
    any attempt by Milosevic to use force against the Podgorica regime would be met with counterforce.
    Since the war, several alliance members have encouraged Montenegrin continued, nay increased, defiance of Belgrade.
    NATO has thus incurred a moral obligation to Montenegro in the event of any intervention by Serbia.
    Were it to refuse to recognize and act on thatobligation, its moral stance and credibility would be threatened.
    • In any case, NATO would inevitably become increasingly caught up in any conflict. As has been argued above, any conflict could not be confined within Montenegrin borders. However unofficially, neighbouring states would become involved. The alliance has extensive responsibilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, especially for security and borders.
    • Moreover, there would certainly be great, probably irresistible pressure for it to support efforts to bring humanitarian aid to areas of fighting, to help and protect the inevitable refugees and probably to impose peace.

    As Montenegro would be an even more forbidding environment than Kosovo for NATO peacekeeping, let alone peace enforcement, operations, the alliance should be doing everything it can to deter civil war there.
    This implies the twin track approach apparently being followed by some powers, but implemented more clearly and forcibly:
    • Using diplomatic and financial/economic carrots and sticks to dissuade Montenegrin nationalists from pressing the independence issue;
    • Impressing unequivocally on Milosevic that exploding Montenegro is not one of the options that he can use to solve his domestic Serbian problems. Currently, he is all too aware that there is little stomach in NATO for any involvement on the ground (the only sort that would make a difference) and he could easily fall prey to wishful thinking and believe that military intervention was out of the question. To be effective, deterrence requires the assembly of forces, including ground troops, in the region before the crisis peaks and can slide into conflict.

  6. #206
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Epilog incidenta u okolini Rožaja u kojem su pripadnici VJ pucali na izbjeglice sa Kosova u aprilu 1999:



    Čitav slučaj je poznat kao "Kaluđerski laz" kao što je napisano na jednoj od prethodnih stranica:
    http://www.forum.cdm.me/showthread.php?166868-Crna-Gora-na-ivici-rata-1998-2000&p=4373831#post4373831

    ------------------------------------------

    3. aprila 1999. SFOR je minirao dio pruge Beograd-Bar koji prolazi kroz Bosnu u cilju onemogućavanja tranzita trupa VJ željeznicom kroz BIH tj. između centralne Srbije i Crne Gore.


  7. #207
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Segmenti iz izvještaja Međunarodne krizne grupe o stanju u Crnoj Gori u martu 2000.

    International Crisis Group (ICG)
    21 March 2000
    Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano


    Montenegro has been a crisis-in-waiting for two years now, with Belgrade opposing efforts by a reform-minded government under President Milo Djukanovic to distance itself ever further from its federal partner Serbia.

    Federal President Slobodan Miloševic has steadily escalated the pressure against Djukanovic, probing the extent of NATO support for Montenegro and pushing the Montenegrins toward a misstep that might undermine their international backing.

    Each of the three possible policy-paths facing the Montenegro government, however, is unappealing in its own way:
    · Going ahead with a referendum on independence for Montenegro would risk radicalising a population still peacefully divided over the issue, and would offer maximum provocation to Belgrade, which retains a powerful military presence in Montenegro.
    · Maintaining the status quo may offer a better chance of avoiding open confrontation with Belgrade, but it leaves Montenegro in a limbo. Its friends are not offering all the help they could, on the grounds that it is not a sovereign state; but prospects for self-generated income through inward investment or revival of the tourist industry are still hostage to international risk perceptions.
    · Achieving rapprochement with the Serbian government would be possible if Miloševic went. But Montenegro cannot afford to leave its future in the unsure hands of the present Serbian opposition. And as the atmosphere in Serbia steadily worsens, political and public opinion in Montenegro appears to grow ever less willing to compromise.

    Djukanovic is under some domestic pressure to move faster towards holding a referendum, but all his foreign contacts are advising him to go carefully and not provoke Belgrade into a response, and for the moment he is being patient.
    For its part, the Belgrade regime seems content for now to play a cat-and-mouse game with the Montenegrin government and population, keeping them nervous and not knowing what to expect.
    Montenegro's dual-currency system-with both Deutschmarks and dinars as legal tender-appears to have stabilised the economy at the cost of unwelcome if temporary inflation, but Serbia has intensified its trade and financial blockade.

    Overall, the situation is fragile, and could deteriorate rapidly. The fifth war of the break-up of Yugoslavia may not be far away. Montenegro's friends need to act quickly, decisively and visibly if this prospect is to be avoided.
    The NATO allies can help Djukanovic out of his policy trilemma
    · by giving Montenegro the economic support it deserves but is presently being denied (reducing the perceived advantages of independence);
    · by increasing the presence and visibility of the international community in Montenegro (giving political support, and raising the stakes for any would-be attacker); and
    · by making a stronger direct commitment to Montenegro's security, backing that commitment with a formal authorisation to NATO to commence military planning and appropriate movement of forces.

    Unless an effective deterrent strategy is rapidly developed and applied, the international community will again cede the initiative to Miloševic, and could yet again in the Balkans find itself reacting, after the event, to killing and destruction that could have been prevented.

    Recommendations
    Security
    1. The NATO allies should make a commitment that any attempt to use force to install a pro-Belgrade government in Montenegro will be met with a forceful military response, and convey that warning to Miloševic openly or privately.
    2. The North Atlantic Council should formally task the NATO military command to plan such a response, and there should be movement of forces in the region appropriate to demonstrate seriousness of purpose.
    Economic
    1. The forthcoming Regional Financing Conference of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe should be the occasion for a major international focus on, and response to, Montenegro's economic and financial needs.
    2. Montenegro should be given further substantial balance of payments and general budgetary support, and funding for major infrastructure projects satisfying World Bank criteria.
    3. If the necessary support cannot or will not be provided by international financial institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or European Investment Bank, on the ground of Montenegro's non-sovereignty or the indebtedness of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then it should be provided bilaterally.
    4. The other major economic powers should follow Germany's lead in providing investment guarantees for companies prepared to invest in Montenegro.
    5. The Montenegrin government should be offered the assistance of both EU and United States officials in establishing an aid co-ordination unit to strengthen Montenegro's absorptive capacity and improve co-operation among agencies.
    Political and Other
    1. Every opportunity should be taken in capitals to publicly express political support for the Djukanovic Government in its resistance to harassment and intimidation from Belgrade.
    2. A major effort should be made to increase the presence and visibility on the ground in Montenegro of the international community, both governmental and non-governmental. In particular:
    a. there should be an increase in high-level visits to Montenegro by ministers, officials and parliamentarians;
    b. the European Union should open a flagged and permanently staffed office in Podgorica, the primary function of which could be to co-ordinate aid delivery by the European Commission and Member States;
    c. the European Community Monitoring Mission should expand its presence, especially in the north of Montenegro, and make public its findings; and
    d. both inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations should be encouraged to make a special effort whenever possible to hold meetings, seminars and conferences in Podgorica.
    e. To further thicken the international presence in Montenegro, governments, humanitarian assistance agencies and other international organisations active in Kosovo and Bosnia should be encouraged to use, as far as possible, the port of Bar for the transit of supplies.
    ................................

    To the traveller and resident in Montenegro there is little sign of Yugoslavia. Even the federal army is generally content to keep out of sight. The republic runs its own affairs in ways that exactly resemble those of an independent country. Both government and opposition stage their political debate with a domestic audience in mind. The future of Montenegro would excite little interest outside specialist foreign-affairs circles but for one factor: the capacity of Belgrade to intervene forcefully, and the general fear that this would bring with it bloodletting in Montenegro, in the fifth war of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

    Such a war would be disastrous for all concerned, not just for Montenegrins. It would show that the international community, and the West in particular, after ten years of trying has still not mustered the capacity or will to prevent foreseeable conflict in the Balkans. It would offer the US government a new and unwanted challenge of leadership in an election year. If fighting broke out, experience suggests that Western countries would be reluctant to commit ground troops on the Montenegrin side, opening up the prospect of another Bosnia on the world's TV screens. For an air-war, another NATO-led coalition would desirably need to be put together-and the last one only just weathered the Kosovo conflict. KFOR troops in Kosovo would be increasingly isolated, and the aid effort would lose an important supply corridor. KLA hotheads might start arming the Albanians in Ulcinj and Plav. Serbia would be condemned to yet more suffering for a doomed cause. Even for Miloševic himself-maybe a master of tactics but always a long-term loser-the diversion of a war in Montenegro would bring no long-term advantage: Montenegro offers little plunder, and the port of Bar would soon be closed by international blockade.
    Last edited by ASC; 07-12-16 at 11:11.

  8. #208
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Referendum
    The risks of holding a referendum on Montenegro's status are well understood by Djukanovic. In addition to the possibility of provoking Serbia into a violent response, there is the possibility that the referendum itself might polarise Montenegrin society so badly that some kind of spontaneous internal conflict might result. In any case Djukanovic would not call a referendum unless he were confident of obtaining a substantial affirmative vote.
    A hint of the way public feeling is going was provided by a recent poll:

    Unity with Serbia 5.5 %
    Keep Yugoslavia as now 28.0 %
    Confederation (DŽB Platform) 22.5 %
    Independent sovereign state 36.1 %
    Don't know 7.9 %
    If these figures are reliable public opinion is running ahead of Djukanovic's caution, even among his own supporters. The political classes are moving in the same direction. The DPS is itself split on the subject, and Djukanovic faces pressures from both within the coalition (SDP) and outside (LSCG) to move faster and more decisively. But all of his foreign government contacts are telling him not to press the issue. Djukanovic presently resolves the impasse by making vague statements that the status of Montenegro must be resolved this year, but avoiding any deadlines.

    A referendum offering a straight choice between Yugoslavia and independence could probably be won now. But a narrow and divisive victory would do more harm than good. Something like a 70 -30 per cent vote would be necessary if the result were to be convincing: this means picking up a lot of marginal voters on the DPS/SNP borderlands. Djukanovic's support is broad-based, multi-ethnic and multi-religious but he needs more support from the traditional Orthodox Montenegrin voter. The referendum remains a high-risk option, for use if at all only when all else has failed.

    ------------------------------------------

    (Tabela iz drugog izvještaja, novembar 2000.)

  9. #209
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    The Threat: Relations with Belgrade

    The common image of Montenegro in the West is something like a man stealing a bone from a fierce but sleeping dog: how fast and how far can the man get before the dog wakes up and bites him?
    That picture is recognisable to Montenegrin minds too.
    The state and independent media talk quite openly of "sukob" (conflict) beginning any day now-the Balkan fighting season traditionally begins in the spring as the risks of bad weather diminish.

    Montenegrins do not want conflict, but the atmosphere is grim readiness rather than fear. Montenegro is not like Bosnia or Kosovo, with a largely defenceless population easy meat for military and paramilitary attacks: it possesses up to 20,000 loyal, motivated, trained and reasonably well-armed police personnel well aware of the threat. They would, moreover, be fighting at home and Montenegrins have several centuries' experience of never giving up.
    But Belgrade would have at its disposal the nearly 14,000 federal army (VJ) forces already stationed in Montenegro, plus the Seventh Military Police Battalion that consists of 1,000 pro-Milosevic paramilitary personnel, and would also be able to count on the support of its airborne brigade located at Niš (which helps explain Belgrade's determination to maintain federal control over Montenegrin airports). The bottom line is that in a straight fight the Montenegrins would be outgunned.

    But what of the federal army's willingness to fight? There is another difference from Bosnia and Kosovo, in that this would be the first Orthodox v Orthodox conflict fought by Serbian troops.
    Even after the experiences of the last ten years it is hard to imagine most conscript soldiers much enjoying carrying out military operations against Montenegrins, and there is the extra complication that the ethnic division between Serb and Montenegrin is blurred.
    Many Montenegrins indeed believe that the army will not fight. But this degree of optimism seems too complacent - the news on 27 February 2000 that many serving army officers in Montenegro had been withdrawn to Serbia and replaced with ex-Kosovo hard men, some 120 of them, raised tension in Podgorica another notch, and understandably so.


    Serb or pro-Miloševic paramilitaries are a particular source of anxiety for the Montenegrins. Although reports of Serb paramilitaries entering Montenegro have been common at least since the NATO bombings in spring 1999 (given currency by the Montenegrin government among others), and in a country with so many police checkpoints the authorities at least have a fair idea of who is moving about, the numbers involved are not clear.[24] But there is much speculation as to how such forces might be used. The scenario thought most likely by the Podgorica authorities is that pro-Belgrade units outside the army line of command will be used to create disturbances in order to give an appearance that the Podgorica government is unable to control its territory: Belgrade would then order the federal army into action to "re-establish stability." At least for the moment this is not happening, and there is little indication that the pro-Yugoslavia elements of the population are ready to fight (unlike, say, the Serbs in Bosnia in 1992).

    At the moment Belgrade appears to be trying to step up tension without forcing the issue. At least three incidents which could have provided an excuse have been allowed to go by in recent months: the stand-off between Montenegrin police and federal soldiers at Podgorica airport on 9 December 1999, which showed how volatile the situation is but has had no follow-up; rival celebrations at Orthodox New Year between followers of the Serbian and Montenegrin churches, when police turned up in great numbers but the atmosphere remained cheerful; and the murder in Belgrade on 7 February 2000 of federal Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic, a Montenegrin and a political enemy of Djukanovic.[25]

    So Djukanovic continues to creep away with the bone, but how far will he be allowed to carry it? There are plenty of tripwires in the coming months which could bring a reaction from Belgrade: possible disappearance of the dinar in Montenegro, which will make it impossible to pay the army; loss of support for the SNP in local elections, which will show that the political battle cannot be won; perhaps even discovery of oil under Montenegrin waters, which would suddenly increase the small republic's strategic value.[26] But to a certain extent the tripwires are irrelevant. The Montenegrins know that if Belgrade wants trouble, for its own reasons, it can always find an excuse.

    For now there is a cold war between Podgorica and Belgrade, and one gaining in intensity. Serbian police and customs are preventing goods from travelling between the two republics: since 3 March 2000 the border has been effectively closed to goods traffic.
    Money transfers between the two have been suspended since the introduction of the two-currency system in Montenegro in November 1999.
    The federal Constitutional Court has declared illegal several actions of the Montenegrin government, including the introduction of the two-currency system; the government has replied that since federal structures are not functioning it does not acknowledge the standing of the court.


    And there are plenty of recent actions from Belgrade, which could be read either as positioning for a crisis, or just pawn-moves tightening the pressure on Podgorica - or both, since the opportunistic Miloševic will be watching to exploit any advantage he may find he has gained. For instance: harsh-sounding statements from the Yugoslav army on 14 February 2000, and the heads of the army and navy on 16 March; closure for two days by federal authorities of Tivat coastal airport on 14 and 16 February; opening of three transmitters on army territory to broadcast Belgrade TV to Montenegrins on 17-18 February (the fact that the Belgrade point of view, or Belgrade propaganda, is available to those who want it raises fears of deeper divisions among the populace, and the TV broadcasts are seen as preparation for the "destabilisation by disturbance" or "artificial civil war" scenario feared by the Podgorica government);[27] and reactions to the opening of a crossing into Albania, including the (later denied) declaration of "second stage of war-readiness" and the erection, sporadically from 27 February, of an army check-point near this frontier.

    Liberal Montenegrins bemoan their government's inactivity in the face of these various moves and the politicians have no consistent strategy whether to respond or not. Prime Minister Vujanovic went to Belgrade to talk to the army commanders about their activity in Montenegro. More recently president Djukanovic has warned the army to abide by the federal constitution, rather than act as a personal army for Miloševic.[28] But brinkmanship is a hard game to play, and Miloševic has many years' experience. The possibility needs to be considered that the above events are in fact not part of a chain intended to destabilise Montenegro, but simply the army and federal authorities "doing their job." But after ten years of studying the Miloševic method, very few observers believe this, and each new incident, following closely on the last, makes it less credible.[29]

    Despite this background the declared policy of the Montenegrin government is that it hopes to resolve Montenegro's future status within Yugoslavia, and its relationship with Serbia, by political debate and agreement rather than by unilateral actions from either side. Sitting uneasily between the increasingly strained status quo, and the unlikelihood that Serbia will be ready to compromise on, or even talk about, the Platform Proposal, are Djukanovic's statements that the issue will be resolved this year: proceeding with a referendum on independence remains, of course, the biggest tripwire of all.

  10. #210
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Military Support

    Just as there are attractions in having a "thickened" civilian international presence on the ground as both a gesture of support and a form of deterrence against attack, so too are there attractions in having a military presence without aggressive capability or intent, along the lines of the UNPREDEP preventive deployment mission in Macedonia.
    But any UN mission would require a Security Council Resolution, for which at the moment there is obviously no consensus, and there are difficulties in the way of a NATO or other operation: countries worry about status of forces agreements (the sovereignty issue again), and others are concerned about their nationals lacking a sufficient response capacity in this situation and being taken hostage in the event that conflict broke out.

    Another form of deterrent but non-aggressive military presence would be for KFOR and SFOR to use Bar as a supply port, and the Sarajevo-Pec road as a mutual link. But in addition to the other difficulties just mentioned, NATO commanders would need orders how to react if the Yugoslav army attempted to impede - with something as simple as a pole across the road - movements of foreign forces on Yugoslav territory.
    In such cases the boundary between support for Montenegro and direct provocation of Belgrade is unclear. NATO would be in effect calling Miloševic's bluff, and he has shown in the past that he finds such games irresistible. Being prepared to fight for Montenegro if necessary is very different from picking a fight over it.
    Any question of military support for Montenegro by way of arms supply - and there is no doubt that heavy armour would be a welcome addition to police force's capacity to resist a coup-like assault - is pre-empted by the UN Security Council's arms embargo.[39]

    So the issue of military support comes down to the question of whether a security commitment should be made to Montenegro. As already discussed, nothing of this kind has so far been forthcoming, although there have been many generalised warnings given.[40]
    The first question to ask is would the NATO allies, or any of them, be prepared to intervene militarily to save Montenegro from the exercise of force by Belgrade?
    The answer, although one cannot be completely confident, is probably yes, with the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo still fresh, and everything that makes Montenegro a special case, important to the success of the whole Balkan commitment, clear enough in political leaders' minds. The stakes would be particularly high in the US in an election year: while the outgoing president would not want US casualties, he equally could not afford to lay his administration open to the accusation that the policy of containing and eventually unseating Miloševic had failed.

    Would, then, the NATO allies be prepared to make their intention to intervene clear in advance of the need, in order to prevent that need from actually arising? That is the nub of the issue, as it often is when conflict prevention is being discussed. Given the way Miloševic has been testing the waters in these first months of 2000, and the way his perception of Western reactions must be a factor in his calculations, it is completely logical to believe that a credible threat made now would reduce the likelihood of the need to make it good.

    So what holds the NATO allies back?
    First, their own divisions, and the memory of how Kosovo nearly split the alliance last year. Secondly, their lawyers' concern that the relationship between Belgrade and Podgorica is in international law an internal matter for Yugoslavia - a perception which Miloševic would love to see asserted in public. Thirdly, the consideration that previous military interventions have only appeared justified in response to massive violations of human rights. Fourth, the political assessment of many governments that they will bear fewer domestic political burdens by reacting to Balkan conflicts rather than mustering the resolve to deter them.

    The reality is that only the US has the influence to persuade the allies to deter conflict in Montenegro by warning Miloševic that NATO will intervene militarily if he tries to forcefully replace the Djukanovic government. While one should never underestimate the policy paralysis that can be generated in inter-agency processes in Washington, it remains deeply disappointing that the European Union still finds policy-making much less easy than national governments - and that this often produces unhelpfully weak policies - but for now this is a political fact of life.

    On the question of the "internal" character of a fight between between Belgrade and Podgorica now, the situation resembles a big state threatening a small one much more than it resembles an internal problem of a functioning state.
    The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia exists only in its army (which has effectively been Serbianised), and in a few institutions under complete control of one federal partner.
    Even though mass human rights abuses have yet to occur, the situation is sufficiently different from an ordinary case of secession to justify making an exception of principle.
    The track record of the break-up of Yugoslavia makes a powerful case for seeing Montenegro as another in a series of similar issues stretching back to Slovenia in 1991, in each of which the independence of the breakaway portion of the former Yugoslavia has been accepted by the international community.
    Montenegro looks much more like a state already than Bosnia or Macedonia did at the beginning of the 1990s.

    Certainly the Djukanovic government might fall through its own internal weaknesses, aided by astute propaganda from Belgrade and the SNP. It might lose support if the economy does not improve. But at the moment the most likely threat to it is deliberate destabilisation orchestrated by Belgrade. All governments who wish for both stability and democratic pluralism in the Balkans need to support the Djukanovic experiment - meaning not Djukanovic personally, but the integrity of Montenegro as a self-governing society on acceptable international lines.

    The NATO allies should make a commitment that any attempt to use force to install a pro-Belgrade government in Montenegro will be met with a forceful military response. Whether that commitment is communicated publicly or privately is a matter for governments' judgement.

    The precise nature of the commitment need not be identified. It could take the shape of an air interdiction over the whole of Yugoslavia, and deliberate targeting of Belgrade's command and control systems. But that would be a matter in the first instance for the NATO military command, who should be formally tasked by the North Atlantic Council to plan an appropriate response. Some appropriate movement of forces in the region would be a useful demonstration of the allies' seriousness of purpose.

    No-one wants another war in the Balkans. The point is that an explicit NATO deterrence policy of the kind here proposed may well be the price necessary to avoid one. The alternative is the Cassandra complex all over again: too little too late, with prize-winning journalists recording the disaster. Western governments are well aware of what is going on in Montenegro, and well understand the threat. They are inclined to help, but have run into the familiar problem that the international community is simply not structured to respond to crises which are not actually exploding in its face. Montenegro, like the unfortunate example of Kosovo before it, is the next test case of NATO's capability to actually prevent, rather than just belatedly react to, conflict in the Balkans.

  11. #211
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Politički program DOS-a uoči izbora u septembru 2000.

    Mi, dolepotpisani poslanički kandidati, koji ćemo činiti parlamentarnu većinu, obavezujemo se da ćemo već prvog dana prvog zasedanja novoizabrane Skupštine izglasati sledećih deset akata u cilju vraćanja poverenja naroda u državu i njene organe:

    PRVO
    , usvojićemo deklaraciju o hitnim pripremama za donošenje novog Ustava, radi otklanjanja postojećeg ustavnog haosa. Nova ustavna i zakonska rešenja biće usklađena sa savremenim pravnim i civilizacijskim standardima, posebno u sferi ljudskih sloboda, zaštite građanskih i manjinskih prava, parlamentarizma, odgovornosti vlasti i vladavine prava. Deklaracija će uvažiti potrebu za decentralizacijom države, sa posebnim osvrtom na regionalizaciju Srbije i afirmaciju autonomije Vojvodine i Kosova i Metohije. Istovremeno, propisaćemo zakonsku obavezu za sve nosioce vlasti da prestanu sa selektivnom i diskriminatornom primenom zakona. U formulisanju zakona i vođenju politike rukovodićemo se načelom da je građanima dozvoljeno sve što zakonom nije izričito zabranjeno, a da je vlasti i državi zabranjeno sve što zakonima nije izrekom propisano.

    DRUGO, donećemo rezoluciju kojom se ukida sadašnja ekonomska i politička blokada Crne Gore, a najviši državni organi obavezuju da odmah otpočnu razgovore sa legitimno izabranim rukovodstvom Crne Gore o karakteru i funkcijama buduće državne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore.

    TREĆE, obavezaćemo buduću Vladu da odmah podnese program konkretnih mera Savetu bezbednosti UN-a kojim bi se omogućila dosledna primena Rezolucije 1244 o Kosovu, očuvao teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet Srbije, garantovala prava na miran i siguran život svim stanovnicima Kosova i podstakla njegova integracija u nove demokratske institucije zemlje. Posebno ćemo insistirati da se hitno reši pitanje otetih i ubijenih lica nakon dolaska KFOR-a.

    ČETVRTO, donećemo zakon kojim ćemo smanjiti broj ministarstava barem za jednu trećinu, ukinuti sva ministarska mesta "bez portfelja" i ograničiti broj potpredsedničkih mesta na najviše tri. Istovremeno, usvojićemo odluku kojom se smanjuje broj skupštinskih odbora i komisija za jednu trećinu, a osoblje skupštinskih odbora i komisija takođe za jednu trećinu. Odluka će istovremeno obavezati sve skupštinske odbore i komisije na potpunu javnost u radu, bez izuzetaka.

    PETO, donećemo zakon kojim se svim poslanicima i članovima Vlade zabranjuje gomilanje funkcija tokom trajanja mandata. Članovima Vlade biće izričito zabranjeno da tokom svog mandata upravljaju privrednim organizacijama (privatnim, društvenim ili državnim). Narodni poslanici i članovi Vlade imaće pravo na članstvo u samo jednom upravnom (nadzornom) odboru privrednih, sportskih, naučnih i drugih društvenih organizacija, ali bez prava na primanje ikakve nadoknade u bilo kom obliku za taj angažman. Svim članovima Vlade će biti zabranjeno da koriste službena prevozna sredstva, službena sredstva za rad i prateće državne službe van vremena obavljanja službenih funkcija.

    ŠESTO, izglasaćemo rezoluciju kojom će se nova Vlada obavezati da u roku od sto dana stavi na uvid nadležnim skupštinskim odborima sve tajne policijske dosijee prikupljene o građanima bez njihovog znanja, osim u slučaju kada se radi o potrebama državnih organa za vođenje krivičnih postupaka u obračunu sa kriminalom. Dokumentacija specijalnih službi koja nema operativnu vrednost biće ustupljena na čuvanje državnim arhivima. Posebnim zakonom, u skladu sa evropskim standardima, biće uređen sistem službene evidencije podataka o građanima u vezi sa bezbednošću i odbranom zemlje. Nadležni skupštinski odbor vršiće redovnu političku kontrolu sprovođenja ovog zakona.

    SEDMO, usvojićemo skupštinsku rezoluciju kojom će svi članovi Vlade i narodni poslanici biti obavezani da objave detaljan pregled svog imovinskog stanja i imovinskog stanja članova najuže porodice na dan stupanja na dužnost, kao i na dan napuštanja dužnosti. Narodni poslanici i članovi Vlade biće obavezni da javno evidentiraju poklone, novčane priloge i donacije primljene tokom trajanja mandata prilikom službenih poseta, službenih kontakata i obavljanja ostalih javnih funkcija.

    OSMO, donećemo rezoluciju kojom se od Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije zahteva da odmah obustavi primenu onih zakona koji proizvode ogromnu društvenu štetu Srbiji i njenim građanima; da stavi van snage sadašnje zakone o informisanju i o univerzitetu, a umesto njih proglasi važećim prethodne zakone do donošenja novih; da ukine zakon o “oduzimanju neobrađenog zemljišta seljacima” i zakon o “predsedničkim privilegijama”; da obustavi primenu sadašnjeg zakona o privatizaciji do donošenja odgovarajućih izmena po hitnom postupku. Istovremeno, odmah će biti ukinuta taksa za izlazak iz zemlje.

    DEVETO, odabraćemo jednu renomiranu, nezavisnu revizorsku kuću koja će biti zadužena da izvrši reviziju budžeta i obavi temeljan pregled finansijskog poslovanja Skupštine i Vlade tokom prethodnih mandata i da podatke o eventualnim nenamenskim izdacima, zloupotrebama, malverzacijama i prekomernim trošenjima učini javnim. Ova firma će istovremeno dati svoj predlog na osnovu koga će Skupština i Vlada usvojiti propise za sprovođenje maksimalne štednje u poslovanju ovih javnih institucija (racionalizacija voznog parka, reprezentacije, opremanja kabineta i ostalih službenih prostorija, itd.).

    DESETO, Skupština će formirati nezavisnu komisiju eksperata koja će preispitati i obnarodovati sve relevantne dokumente i audio-video zapise koje je sadašnja vlast držala u tajnosti, a odnose se na vođenje unutrašnje i spoljne politike Srbije i Jugoslavije u periodu 1987–2000. godine, kao i sadržaj svih razgovora i pregovora visokih državnih funkcionera koji su predodredili sudbinu nacije u ovom razdoblju.
    Last edited by ASC; 21-01-17 at 01:12.

  12. #212
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Podgorica
    15. januar 1998.

    jutro nakon sukoba




  13. #213
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Podgorica
    31. maj 1998
    Dan parlamentarnih izbora



  14. #214
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Podgorica
    29. maj 1999.

    Protest Liberalnog saveza








    Grafit u Podgorici

  15. #215
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Podgorica
    25. septembar 2000.
    Dan nakon saveznih izbora


    Narednih dana je situacija bila neizvjesna jer se nije znalo hoće li Milošević da uvede vanredno stanje i hoće li mu poći za rukom da iskoristi policiju i vojsku da se obračuna sa opozicijom u Srbiji i zadrži vlast.

    Podgorica
    26-29 septembar 2000.
















  16. #216
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    7,711
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    1,471
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    4,351
    Thanked in
    1,680 Posts

    Default

    Uništavanje naoružanja u godinama nakon pada Miloševića...

    Maj 2003



    A boy sets a bunch of rifles on fire.
    Over 5,000 firearms and other weapons were melted down in a blazing furnace at the Niksic ironworks facility, Podgorica,Montenegro.
    Following an intense media campaign supported by the U.S. government's USAID organization, the United Nations Development Program and local peace groups, hundreds of traditionally gun-loving Montenegrins handed over 5000 firearms, including one anti-aircraft cannon.


    Februar 2006


  17. #217
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Terrae Dominus Montenegro
    Posts
    6,311
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    0
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    1
    Thanked in
    1 Post

    Default

    ASC...šta reći....proveo sam pristojno vremena čitajući i evocirajući sjećanja. Ne možeš pojmiti koliko sam ti zahvalan. Vratilo me u neke mlađe dane.
    Zanimljivo mi je bilo vidjeti koliko postoji i internetom je dostupno fotografija na kojima se vide moji bivši kolega koji su tada čuvali zemlju i mir Neke fotografije su iz vremena prije nego su pretrčali jer SAJ i Posebne jedinice Policije u oko 50% činili su bivši profesionalni starješine i bivši profesionalni vojnici (ugovorci) nekadašnje i odavno blagopočivše VJ. Neki su pretrčali iz patriotizma a neki i iz drugih motiva. Šta god im bili motivi bez njih današnje CG ne bi bilo.
    Možda je slučajnost što sam temu otvorio upravo kada se vidi načelnik Fehmija (Feho) Mehović kako sa dječakom pali oružje u nekoj plemenitoj akciji "Vrati oružje" ili nešto tako...Tom prilikom je uništeno i ogromno pješadijsko oružje koje smo 1999. i 2000. nabavili kako bi se naoružao narod za slučaj potrebe da se branimo od invazije Miloševićeve armade. No, on je u međuvremenu pao. Ipak, bilo je kratkovido uništiti to oružje. Ako ne što drugo moglo se prodati...
    Bilo kako bilo...vratih se skoro 20 godina unazad...I to baš večeras...
    An omen?...Let's pray to God that it is not...

  18. #218
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Indie OTS
    Posts
    17,996
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    254
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    1,908
    Thanked in
    674 Posts

    Default

    Vratio se batinas. Kako je u CG ratuje li se ili je jos na ivici?

  19. #219
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    Indie OTS
    Posts
    17,996
    Thanks Thanks Given 
    254
    Thanks Thanks Received 
    1,908
    Thanked in
    674 Posts

    Default

    Podsjeti me Sandor na ovaj miting pa neka se taguje ko je bio haha Ima veze sa ovim godinama no se plasim da vrijedja ove sto su sacuvali mir i stabilnost tada i CG u sklopu male velike Srbije. Pa kaze Milo Srbine.


Page 9 of 9 FirstFirst ... 56789

Thread Information

Users Browsing this Thread

There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)

Similar Threads

  1. Ima li Crna Gora more?
    By minjo in forum Budućnost Crne Gore
    Replies: 1167
    Last Post: 27-07-18, 15:01
  2. [Crna Gora]^ CS
    By vuk89 in forum Game Server CG
    Replies: 56
    Last Post: 21-11-09, 19:24
  3. Pa da se krene: CRNA GORA - Bugarska; CRNA GORA - Irska
    By ckamalama in forum Ostali sportovi
    Replies: 141
    Last Post: 07-09-08, 13:25
  4. Crna Gora!
    By shrek in forum Budućnost Crne Gore
    Replies: 86
    Last Post: 28-03-05, 00:50

Bookmarks

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •