SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT
Possible Triggers for Conflict
The uneasy status quo may continue over the election period, though it would be unwise to count on it. It is unlikely to persist over a longer stretch as the internal situation in Montenegro and in Yugoslavia is unstable.
Trigger points for the destabilization of Montenegro could be any of the following, alone or in combination:
• President Djukanovic announces a referendum on independence;
• The FRY government announces that it will suspend the Montenegrin parliament for unconstitutional activity (eg, trying to sabotage federal elections, denying Montenegrins a democratic choice, or persistent refusal to accept and implement federal laws);
• Local outbreaks of violence in response to disputes over the control of military and other facilities, especially airports, leading to military activity by the VJ and possible mobilization to protect federal installations;
• Montenegrin closure of the border with Serbia;
• Montenegrin government mobilization of local defence/police forces under its control, possibly accompanied by a declaration by the Podgorica parliament of a referendum or even independence, or following a border incident or a dispute over the control of customs/transit of goods/attempt to lift the FRY blockade by force;
• A change of leadership in Montenegro, or in the FRY, after which Montenegro initiates moves towards independence;
• Increasing levels of political ("terrorist") violence in the FRY, blamed on violent Montenegrin nationalists and leading to the declaration of a FRYwide state of emergency;
• Milosevic-controlled paramilitaries enter Montenegro and are opposed by the local population;
• The north-south split in Montenegro revealed in the June local elections creates a de facto internal border in the republic.
Scenarios for the Development of Conflict
There is no realistic prospect of a pro-Milosevic coup ousting the Djukanovic government. The essential element of surprise action by forces at the heart of the regime is absent. Unlike Croatia and Bosnia when the break up of the old Yugoslavia started, the Montenegrin government is alert and wellprepared.
It fields an increasingly well-armed, well-trained and largely reliable, mostly paramilitary, police force reputed to number up to 20,000 (making one Montenegrin in 30 a policeman!). The VJ's 2nd Army, stationed in Montenegro, is probably of similar strength and has almost a monopoly of heavy equipment. Its commander, Col Gen Obradovic is a Milosevic placeman and the majority of officers and soldiers are Serbs.
However, not all of the 20% or so Montenegrins could be relied on and even many of the Serbs probably have little stomach for an internecine fight.
Any attempt to seize power in Podgorica using the VJ, spearheaded by the Serb/federalist manned 7th Military Police Battalion, would inevitably be the precursor to civil war. The following scenarios suggest ways in which conflict could develop. They could develop consecutively as a result of escalation or simultaneously.
First scenario
Belgrade attempts to pre-empt by military force moves towards greater Montenegrin autonomy or independence.
Each side mobilizes its assets in Montenegro, with Serbian nationalist militias moving in to reinforce the VJ.
There is a short, sharp conflict, probably starting before the completion of mobilization, over control of federal strategic facilities such as Podgorica airport or the port of Bar.
Fighting would be intense and largely conventional, limited to key political, administrative and transportation choke points and lasting a week or two.
Whoever won this phase, it would, however, be unlikely to be decisive.
There would likely be a slide into one of the other scenarios as the population would be both inflamed and polarized, with those hitherto reluctant to become involved being forced to choose sides.
Second scenario
Most likely, this would evolve from the first scenario.
It could, though, as postulated above, develop from the current, highly visible stand-off between the VJ and the Montenegrin police which leads to armed clashes and/or a series of escalating political moves and counter-moves.
In either case, a high intensity civil war develops. This would cover most or all of the country and involve most of the population in a struggle over the issue of independence; the more bitter and prolonged the struggle, the less possibility there will be of a compromise on greater autonomy for Montenegro within a FRY framework.
The main contenders are likely to be rival militias/paramilitaries. Fighting would become increasingly brutal and civilians would be deliberately targeted by both sides, resulting in large displacements of population.
As Montenegro is mainly mountainous, especially in the north, with few arterial roads connecting different regions, there is likely to be an intense struggle to seize and hold the mainly narrow passes.
The northern region is mainly Serb and federalist inhabited, but the bulk of the Muslim population lives in the Sandzak (which straddles the border with Serbia) and there is a large Albanian enclave in the municipality of Plav on the border with Kosovo.
These topographical and demographic facts would strongly influence the location and nature of the fighting, the flow of displaced persons and humanitarian aid efforts.
Third scenario
This is probably the most likely, possibly resulting from the failure of either side to win a quick victory in either of the other two.
It could well stem from the refusal of the Serb/federalist north, supported by the VJ, to accept secessionist moves by the Podgorica government.
In this case the conflict could possibly be confined to the mountainous regions of the north, though there could be no guarantee that it would not engulf the whole.
The conflict would resemble that in Bosnia. Communities would be forced to choose between allegiances and pockets of fighting would develop between neighbours divided along political, ethnic and clan/family lines.
Some villages would be razed and others subjected to prolonged sieges.
There would be no well-defined front line; rather a series of disconnected battlefields with gaps between them.
Much military effort would be directed less against the enemy's forces than against civilians with the aim of terrorising them into submission or flight.
Population movements would largely comprise efforts by the old, women and children to flee, with the men staying put to fight.
To complicate matters still further, banditry, blood - feuds (both traditional in the region) and squabbles over booty would be an added source of fighting.
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
Standing aloof from a conflict in Montenegro is probably not an option for NATO.
• When Montenegro adopted an anti-Milosevic stand during the Kosovo war (despite being subjected to NATO bombing), the alliance clearly promised to protect the republic from the consequences;
any attempt by Milosevic to use force against the Podgorica regime would be met with counterforce.
Since the war, several alliance members have encouraged Montenegrin continued, nay increased, defiance of Belgrade.
NATO has thus incurred a moral obligation to Montenegro in the event of any intervention by Serbia.
Were it to refuse to recognize and act on thatobligation, its moral stance and credibility would be threatened.
• In any case, NATO would inevitably become increasingly caught up in any conflict. As has been argued above, any conflict could not be confined within Montenegrin borders. However unofficially, neighbouring states would become involved. The alliance has extensive responsibilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, especially for security and borders.
• Moreover, there would certainly be great, probably irresistible pressure for it to support efforts to bring humanitarian aid to areas of fighting, to help and protect the inevitable refugees and probably to impose peace.
As Montenegro would be an even more forbidding environment than Kosovo for NATO peacekeeping, let alone peace enforcement, operations, the alliance should be doing everything it can to deter civil war there.
This implies the twin track approach apparently being followed by some powers, but implemented more clearly and forcibly:
• Using diplomatic and financial/economic carrots and sticks to dissuade Montenegrin nationalists from pressing the independence issue;
• Impressing unequivocally on Milosevic that exploding Montenegro is not one of the options that he can use to solve his domestic Serbian problems. Currently, he is all too aware that there is little stomach in NATO for any involvement on the ground (the only sort that would make a difference) and he could easily fall prey to wishful thinking and believe that military intervention was out of the question. To be effective, deterrence requires the assembly of forces, including ground troops, in the region before the crisis peaks and can slide into conflict.
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