Da bi dobili kontekst tadašnjih izjava i kremaljskog narativa o
nesmetanju UA članstava u NATO, nećemo izostavljati to da je te 2002. Rusija imala drugačiji odnos sa Alijansom i očekivanja od takvog odnosa. Upravo te godine je formiran NRC iliti Viječe NATO-Rusija. Obje strane su imale svoje motive za saradnju, no čini se da ista nije ispunila očekivanja Rusije.
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created on 28 May 2002 during the 2002 NATO Summit in Rome. The NRC was designed to replace the PJC as the official diplomatic tool for handling security issues and joint projects between NATO and Russia.[33] The structure of the NRC provided that the individual member states and Russia were each equal partners and would meet in areas of common interest, instead of the bilateral format (NATO + 1) established under the PJC.[34] There was no provision granting NATO or Russia any veto powers over the actions of the other. NATO said it had no plans to station nuclear weapons in the new member states or send in new permanent military forces. The parties stated they did not see each other as adversaries, and, "based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security".[35]
Cooperation between Russia and NATO focused on several main sectors: terrorism, military cooperation, Afghanistan (including transportation by Russia of non-military International Security Assistance Force freight (see NATO logistics in the Afghan War), and fighting local drug production), industrial cooperation, and weapons non-proliferation.[36] As a result of its structured working groups across a range of areas, the NRC served as the primary forum for consensus-building, cooperation, and consultation on topics such as terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, airspace management, and missile defense.[34][37]
Taj odnos je posebno narušen Narandžastom revolucijom:
NATO–Russia relations stalled and subsequently started to deteriorate, following the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004–2005 and the Russo-Georgian War in 2008.
Očigledno je da je Rusija tada htjela sferu uticaja po modelu koji ima u Bjelorusiji i htjela je Ukrajinu u EAEU - što je Ukrajina odbila jer je težila evropskom krugu.
Ono što Kremlj tada vidi kao prijetnju svojim politikama a Zapad negira su intenzivirane 'anti-ruske' namjere američkih fondacija i organizacija koje djeluju u UA i pripremajuje je za demokratsko novorođenje:
US democracy assistance programs and US foundations were quite active in Ukraine and Georgia
Indeed, there were US foundations operating in Ukraine as well as in Georgia during the colour revolutions. However, we should not see them as manifestations of US foreign policy: They did not necessarily align themselves with the sitting president’s political agenda.
Takvi sveobuhvatni programi pomoći demokratiji i liberalizaciji Ukrajine finansirani od strane SAD koji su uslijedili nakon revolucije su od strane Rusije viđeni kao udar na njene zacrtane politike i namjere o pomenutoj sferi uticija te kao direktan izraz gradnje američkih sigurnosnih interesa.
Čini se da je Putin do tada igrao dvostruku igru, nakon 9/11 i pružanja pomoći i saradnje i otopljavanja odnosa sa US (što se iz današnje perspektive označava kao
peak dobrih odnosa US i RF) i otpočinjanja saradnje sa NATO te namjere da kontroliše državu - potencijalnu članice NATO (što btw US&co nikad ne bi dopustili),
asistirane promjene u UA označavaju i zaokret Rusije prema širenju NATO.
Ono što se tu može iščitati da je UA tada ostala hibridni režim pod šapom Kremlja poput Bjelorusije, u toj konstelaciji aneksija teritorija i dalji sukobi bi bili - izbjegnuti. Da li je Ukrajina trebala da čeka pout Bjelorusije povoljnije vjetrove za razmrsivanje komplikovanih odnosa sa bivšim nezgodnog partnerom ili joj je bacanje u zagrljaj njegovom največem rivalu uz mahanje srednjim prstom bio pravi put - teme su za budućnost.
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